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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades, conventional mine fields
have been in place along the Demilitarized Zone and in
front of strategic points in Korea. The way in which the
effectiveness of the mine field has been increased and
maintained is the periodic replacement of old mines and
the addition of new mines to the field.
In the initial phase of a war, the enemy will attempt
to use a quick attack to break through the defensive lines,
like the one which was constructed by Korea along the
D.M.Z., in order to seize some preplanned areas. For this
operation, the enemy will use their numerical 1 "Superiority
in tanks and artillery. If the enemy is able to seize
areas which are important politically and economically, the
advance will stop.
There are many ways to improve and reinforce the
defensive line. Against the enemy's quick tank and armored
vehicle attack, the best way is to have a mine field that is
defended by anti-tank weapons.
History and experience have shown that a mine field
defended by an anti-tank weapon is more effective than a
mine field by itself or the anti-tank weapon by itself.
The reason why the mine field is the best means of defense
against the enemy's tanks and armored vehicles is that .

it may restrict the movement of enemy tanks and vehicles
and thereby increase the effectiveness of anti-tank
weapons. A mine field also assists in protecting friendly
forces from sudden attack.
In this thesis, it is assumed that the preinstalled
mines in a mine field act their characteristics with
100 percent reliability. Some simple probabilistic models
are studied for scenarios of a mine field and a mine field
defended by an anti-tank weapon. Algebraic and numerical
results for some cases are provided.

II. SCENARIO ASSUMPTION
A. TERRAIN AND MINE FIELD
The mine field consists of both anti-personnel mines
and anti-tank mines. The mine field is located crossing
the likely axis of enemy advance.
The defensive forces are able to view possible offen-
sive movement over the entire field. The entire field is
also within the effective firing range of the defensive
forces. It will be assumed that the offensive tanks have
no maneuverability problems in the field. The positions of
preinstalled mines are well camouflaged and are of the
pressure-activated type. The offensive tanks cannot vis-
ually detect the mines and hence have no ability to avoid
;the mines.
B. OFFENSIVE FORCES
A limited objective for the offensive forces is to
seize the defending positions. The reconnaissance of the
offensive tanks did not provide enough information about
their combat area to determine the defensive positions,
but the defensive barriers are assumed to be placed along
the axis of advance.
The mission of an anti-tank unit is to create a gap in
the mine field and to destroy the defensive crew-served

weapons or tanks defending the field; these defending weapons
are considered to be a major obstacle for following offensive
forces. It is assumed that the offensive tanks will meet the
mine field in a deployed formation.
C. DEFENSIVE FORCES
The defending forces are occupying preselected strong
points where they can cover the likely axis of advances and
also protect the mine field. Each anti-tank weapon's mission
is to kill the enemy's armored vehicles or tanks in his
assigned area. The anti-tank weapon is in a camouflaged
fixed bunker which has usually one crenel. There are many
bunkers for the crew-served weapons and anti-tank weapons
in one strong point. Hence, even if the offensive tanks
find a crenel, there may not be an anti-tank weapon there.
The dead ground (path) in the area will be covered by
the friendly artillery firing. Thus, the offensive tanks
must pass through the mine field. Usually, the defender
wants to fire at the offensive tanks which are in the mine
field, because the mines tend to restrict the maneuverability
of an offensive tank and thereby make it easier for the
defender to kill the tank.
For simplicity, an offensive tank which successfully
crosses the mine field does not attrack further defensive
fire; that is, the duel between defense and offense will






The preinstalled mine field has W units width and D units
depth with a rectangular shape.
W — <
Figure 1. Mine Field Model
We assume the positions of pressure-activated anti-tank
mines in the field form a spatially homogeneous Poisson
process with the rate of "r" [Ref. 3]; that is, the number
of mines in disjoint paths are independent random variables
and the distribution of the anti-tank mines in the area of
a path is Poisson with mean "r|A|," where |a| is the area
path [A| [Ref. k] . Assume that the track width of a tank
is W units.
Let T, be the position of the first mine that a tank
encounters in its path and J (A) be the number of mines in




Similarly, the probability of tank gets small Z units
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Figure 2. Area of a Path
Let T_ be the position of the second mine in the path;
For J < D
and
-f•** 5 + J <, D
So T,, T- , T_, ... have the same distribution as the




If any tank which get: into the mine field to attack
the defensive encounters a mine, the results may be one of
the following categories:
(0) No Damage
This category of damage neither excludes the
tank from the combat nor limits its mobility or any other
operations.
(1) Slight Damage
The slight damage category also does not affect
the operational characteristics of the tank, but it increases
the vulnerability of the tank to serious damage; for example,
it is more likely that the tank will be completely destroyed
when it encounters the next mine.
(2) Loss of Mobility
This category includes damage to the tank's
track or demolition of its suspension system. The tank is
expected to participate in the duel with the defender until
it is killed by the anti-tank weapon.
(3) Completely Destroyed Damage
This category is defined as total destruction
of the tank functions; that is, loss of mobility, loss of
firepower, etc. A tank with this category of damage has no
more influence on the field.
13

Let X be the class of damage to the tank due to its





2; Loss of mobility
3; Completely destroyed damage (3.1)
assume X = 0.
o
Assume that:
X +1 is conditionally independent of X , X,, X. ...X -
n J c o 1 2 n-lj
given X . The transition probabilities are given as follows
PfXi- i.) X -0}
o : * * o
Let X(z) be the state of a tank due to mine encounters z
units of distance into the mine field. The process (X(z);












with absorbing states 3 (completely destroyed) and 2 (loss
of mobility) . The probability that a tank gets through the
mine field is
P{xcd; & (.o, i)}
by assumption (3.2).
p{ycD) = o } = e
rRD
*
Hence, the probability of a single tank getting through
the mine field is:
P{XC« 6 Co.!)} = c~M + (r-d-c w; I?.
= C i + R»f-)c" p
B . DUEL
When tanks appear in front of the mine field, they are
seen by the defensive forces and the defender's anti-tank
weapon starts to aim at one of the tanks. In general, the
probability that the anti-tank weapon hits the offensive
tank depends on the type of anti-tank weapon, the firing
range, and the ground condition. In this thesis, the hit
probability is assumed to depend only on the defender's
anti-tank weapon type. The interval of the firing time
(the time between rounds fired) is a random variable. The




The offensive tank leader is mainly involved in observ-
ing the battle area rather than trying to detect mines.
His task is also to detect the defender's crew-served weapon
positions. As assumed in the previous section, since the
position of the anti-tank weapon is well camouflaged, the
offensive tanks cannot begin to detect the anti-tank weapon
position until the anti-tank weapon fires and gives away
the region it is in. The probability of detecting the anti-
tank weapon position depends on the distance; that is, the
further away the defender's weapon is, the less likely its
position will be detected when it fires. If any one of the
offensive tanks detects the anti-tank weapon position or is
hit by a mine, the warning and information are given to the
other offensive tanks. When the offensive tanks find a
potential anti-tank weapon position, it is uncertain whether
the offensive tanks have detected the anti-tank weapon or
not. Here it is assumed the offensive tanks can detect the
position of the anti-tank weapon immediately after the anti-
tank weapon's first firing. If an offensive tank hits an
anti-tank weapon, the anti-tank weapon is completely
destroyed.
After the defender's anti-tank weapon first fires, we
assume that there is a duel between the defensive anti-tank
weapon and the offensive tanks with constant hit probabili-




1; if an offensive tank hits the anti-tank
H (T) = / weapon during n"^ round.
.0; otherwise.
Also,
1; if the anti-tank weapon hits an offensive
H (A) =
)
tank during ntn round,
n s
0; otherwise.
Assume {H (T) ; n = 1, 2, . . . } is a discrete time Markov
chain with absorbing state 1,
{N
P{H,CT) =i | U,-,(.T) =1} -1
P{H«(T) -i| H«(T) =0) =PT < (3-3)
/
v Assume (H (A) ; n = 1, 2, . . . } is a discrete time Markov
chain with absorbing state 1,
p{*MA) -i
| H^.c/0 -o} =P, (3.4)
w The firing interval between rounds is independent and
exponential with the rate of A ' for anti-tank weapons and
X* for offensive tanks. These rates include all various
17

intervals between rounds fired, which are aiming interval,
loading interval, converting interval and firing interval.
^ We will assume that the offensive tanks have a constant
velocity through the mine field. Hence, the potential
offensive distances traveled between rounds fired are also
independent and exponential with the rate of X_ for the
anti-tank weapon and A_ for the offensive tank.
All contestants have unlimited ammunition supplies and
begin the duel with loaded weapons. The duel between
offense and defense is assumed to start at the time of the
first firing of the defender's anti-tank weapon or at the
time the first mine is hit, whichever time is smaller.
The duel will be ended when either the offensive or the
/
defensive side is killed or an offensive tank successfully
crosses the mine field.
It is assumed that the offensive tanks damage category
due to anti-tank weapon firing is only killed or not killed.
When the offensive tanks damage category due to mine is
loss of mobility or completely destroyed, the anti-tank
weapon changes its aim objective to the other tank.
Let "S " be the offensive tank position when the anti-
tank weapon is killed by an offensive tank, let "S_" be
the offensive tank position when an offensive tank is
killed by a defensive anti-tank weapon. V Since the intervals
between firing are independent and exponential and
18

assumptions (3.3) and (3.4) hold, and the offensive tanks
travel at a constant velocity.
,
^-C^&f y)T PT )*
and
P{ S. < ST < * } = ( 1 - £<*+**>*)-£&_





Two simple models will be analyzed in detail; the
first being that there is one offensive tank and one anti-
tank weapon of the defender. The duel starts at the time
of the first firing of the defensive anti-tank weapon or
the time the first mine is hit, whichever time is smaller.
The other one is that there are two offensive tanks and
one defensive anti-tank weapon. The offensive tanks start
across the field at the same time and along different
paths. The anti-tank weapon starts to fire as soon as the
offensive tanks enter the field.
If there is only one offensive tank in the field, it
is easy for the operator of the anti-tank weapon on the
defensive side to wait until the offensive tank goes some
distance into the field before the anti-tank weapon fires
its first shot. If two offensive tanks are to get into
the mine field to attack the defensive forces, it is diffi-
cult for the operator of the anti-tank weapon to wait
until the offensive tanks arrive at predetermined positions
before first defensive firing.
In these two models, five parameters which can affect
the result and which can be changed in value with training
or other remedies, will be concerned. They are:
20

(1) The fire rate of an offensive tank (A )
,
(2) The hit probability of an offensive tank (P )
,
(3) The rate of mines in a mine field (R)
,
(4) The fire rate of a defensive anti-tank weapon (A )
,
(5 ) The hit probability of a defensive anti-tank
weapon (P*J .
In the remainder of this section, algebraic solutions
for the probability that an offensive tank successfully
gets through the mine field for the above models, will be
given. In the next section, numerical results and investi-
gation for the sensitivity of the five parameters will be
provided.
A. MODEL ONE
In this model, there is one offensive tank crossing a
preinstalled mine field. The mine field can be either
undefended or defended by one anti-tank weapon.
Let D' be the position of the offensive tank in the
field when the defensive anti-tank weapon fires its first
shot. The position is greater than or equal to "0" and
less than the depth of the mine field (0<D I<:D).
Figure 4. Location of D'
21

The event that the offensive tank successfully gets
through the mine field is the result of several factors;
they are, not hit be a mine, hit by the mine but has slight
damage; not killed by defender's first shot and not killed
by anti-tank weapon in duel during its travel through the
remainder of the mine field.
Let
N =_ <
1; if an offensive tank gets through the mine
field successfully.
- 0; otherwise
1. There is No Defensive Anti-Tank Weapon
p{M(o; =i) - e R% r-d-bc"
(4.1)
2. There is One Defensive Anti-Tank Weapon
In this case, we are concerned with the position of
the first mine which the offensive tank encounters. If the
first mine the offensive tank encounters is less the first
defensive firing position (D 1 )/ then the potential duel
duration is longer than the time for the offensive tank to
travel D-D 1 across the field.
For an offensive tank to get out of the mine field
successfully, there is no mine through its path or just




tank is not killed by the anti-tank weapon's first shot,
and not killed in the duel. Hence,


























We will now consider the special case in which
P - = 0; that is, the offensive tank is killed with proba-












Hence, for the defense, the optimal strategy is to
start firing when the offensive tank first enters the field.
It is possible to derive an analytic solution for the op-
tional D* in the case in which P^, > 0, but it will no
doubt be very complicated. In Section V, the optimal
distance will be evaluated numerically for various cases
of interest.
B. MODEL TWO
In this model there are two offensive tanks to cross
the mine field. They start at the other edge of the mine






The mine field can be either undefended or defended by
the defender's anti-tank weapon.
Assume that the fire rates and hit probabilities of
the offensive tanks are the same and if the mine field is
defended, the duel starts at the time when the offensive
tanks get into the mind field. The probability that the
anti-tank weapon of the defender aims first at any particu-
lar offensive tank is h, whether the first shot of the duel
is offensive or defensive is random.
Let X, (x) be the state of the offensive tank using #1
path x units into the mine field,
X~ (x) be the state of the offensive tank using #2 path
x units into the mine field,
Y(x) be the state of the anti-tank weapon when the
offensive tank is x units into the mine field. By the
previously stated assumptions (3.1), the random variables
X, (x) and X- (x) can take the value {0, 1, 2, 3} and the
random variable Y(x) takes the value {0, 3}.
1. No Anti-Tank Weapon Defends
We can expect several cases; neither tank encounters
a mine in their path; one offensive tank hit a mine and has
slight damage or loss of mobility or completely destroyed
damage, and the other one has no damage; one offensive tank
has slight damage or loss of mobility or completely destroyed
damage and the other one has only slight damage.
25

Hence, letting N(x) be the number of tanks with no
damage or only slight damage:
?{K>(V)Zll = P{Xl(J()=0, X±(x)=o}
t p { X. <# * * * X*(^ * o }
-rPfXfCa) = 3, Xi.(«9 = 0}
tptXi«0*A Xa.c*0* 8}
f p[X,(*) =i ' &W *J
}
+ p{x, M *a, Xlc*> «i 3
+P{Xtf*> *^ X.^ =i }
^ P { X, (^ -3, X^ = 4 }













2. There is One Defensive Anti-Tank Weapon
This case is more complicated than the first case.
Again, let N(x) be the number of tanks with no damage or
only slight damage.
+ ?{YW=-0 > X,c*> = 0, XxW =*}
+ ?{ y<x> » °> Xj^ = i, Xl&> -0}
tf { Yw -0, x, (<*) =0, x^c^ = a}




p{ Y« * 6' X,t*)* 0, X*<*) »3}
tp{ Y(x)= 0, Xic^-i, X*c3$)*l}
tpj Y^ - 0> x,(^; =i, X* (x; = ^}
* p{ Yw - 0* X» ^ = ^ Xi (*; =i
j
*P[ yw^, *'<*> -i. xt (^)=3j
+ p? y<# -°> * ,r^ "*' X2ro- aJ
^P[ YW S 3* x,c?o*0, x^cp-o}
4-P{ Y<*>-*, x,c*>=^ *iWri}J (4.7)
rpf Y09*5j X,cv = o, ^(^--2}
+p£ yw-Sj x,^=2, xA c^ = o}
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f p{ Y&P * 3, x.rx) = -*, x^*; -i.}
*P£ YCx)-J, X,a) = i, Xt«*i}
Finally,




where [1], [II] , . .., [XIV] are defined as below.
By the exponential assumptions of the model, for h small
*P{Y(^)-o, X,wo, Xa c*) = 6J [l-ash+aftoj
Subtracting p{ y<*) - , Xi^ = d. Xkf*)-d} from both
sides, dividing by h and letting h tend to zero, results in
s




[II = f{rcD;-o, x,n>;=c, XtCtf-i}
Similarly,
+ P{ Y ftp ~0, XiOFttj&fe* o) t Rh * »cW] St
s
- C*K**frn*fr> P{ Y«-^ X,fc>*4 Xkf*)*l}













Pi Ycx+w* o, Xi r^h;= o, x*.c**/o = 3}
c
F( Y(x; ^o
, Xi ix> « o , x^o-?}&- c^ajj tM;t) +*c&;j
"f P{Yc^=o, Xi(20*0, X*fX>=o}[R&Mifcfth+*<tf)
+
^(Y^ -0, Xi(*)*0, X*<x) = *}Cf*83h+ifo5b + «<foJ
31

= p{YfW-o, X,cr)=3, XxfB;=o}
32

-+P{Y<x>^X»c*>A,x a.c*^o} CRgjh + *ch)j
j£ f { Y<*> *o, X, coc; = i, x*ttO -i }
--(aR+J/»|fc^*rft)*P{Yc>O a0i XjW*A, X«.W=J.}
p{Y(o;-o, x^p;=a, xi(:p; = i}
= (R-Bi-D.er RP/e"" c;^6r2^TBrJl)





a p{YC^=o, X,f50=i,X^^ aa3}[l-(l?tM^R)ht^h>]
+P{ YW -°> ^ (*; ^' *
W




* m + ihk) r rVb 1 £-«***+**** j
-ck^pOd£^* +^ pJ
-(Rt^)0c^ MtajTMDJ
P{ YfR>*0, X,(o;= 3/ X^c» = l}
35









tp{Y«J'i *<*;- ft >*(*>= o}£ Kg h + *Cb)J
36

p{ rtp;*3, X,rp;=o / Xife)=i}




-R * P{YW S 3, *,<*;= 0, Xz(x)*i)
+ (*MW [ Sx c
f **********
- g4 e
c***** *^?r) y i
C^O-e*










+ffycx)-3,x,w=i l xi ((0-o}r^efc fc*>j
*
--*•£* P{Yw«3, Xieo«A, XiWi}
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[117]- p{Y«»-*, XK»«i, *<d>3>
^Pf Y^;=-^, X»^=i, X.(*;-a}r^ + (b;J
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* PI Tco;=^, Xno)**, x^w-i}
here






flWWO(»t»t*W0 tff-^W I l_
•D)





















In this section, numerical results are presented for
each model with specific parameter values. Insofar as is
possible, the parameter values that are encountered in the
field will be used.
A. MODEL ONE
The numerical results for Model One will be given for






PQ2 = 0.3 R = 0.005 (5.1)
P Q3 = 0.5 PA = PT = 0.6
Here all parameter rates are converted into units of
distance; for example, the value of the fire rate (A.,, X_)
is 0.037 rounds per unit distance which is equal to 5 rounds
fired per minute times the speed of an offensive tank in
the mine field which is 8/60 kilometers per minute.
1. There is No Defensive Anti-Tank Weapon
Table I gives the P{N(D)=1} for some values of D,




Probability that the Tank Gets
Through the Mine Field Successfully




D, depth of a mine field in meters.
If the defender wants to reinforce a mine field with
no anti-tank weapon defense, there is no effective difference
between increasing the rate of mines or lengthening the depth
of the mine field as can be seen from Equation (4.1).
2. One Anti-Tank Weapon Defends
First of all, the optimal offensive tank position








too .100 ?«><> 4oc St>**
Figure 5. Probability of an Offensive Tank Which Gets Through
a Mine Field Successfully.
Speed of offensive tank; 8 kilometers per hour.
48

Figure 5 presents typical graphs obtained from the
numerical evaluation of equation (4.2) for P {N(D)=1}, the
o
probability the tank successfully travels through the mine
field in the case that the anti-tank weapon fires first when
the offensive tank is at position XQ .
Optimal distances for the first shot of a defensive
anti-tank weapon are given in Table II for the parameter
values given in (5.1) for three mine field depths.
TABLE II
Probability of an Offensive Tank









Probability Position Probability Position
300 0.1036 300 0.058 3






The optimal strategy for the defense is to fire its
first show at the offensive position which minimizes the
P{N(D) = 1}. The optimal position for the defense is changed
by changes in the mine field depth and changes in the basic
parameters. However, the change in the optimal position
appears to be small for the range of parameters we are
49

interested in. Table III gives the percent change in
P{N(D) = 1} when parameter values are changed for a field






10 4.76 4.76 -11.94 -19.05 - 4.76
20 9.09 9.09 -22.50 -36.36 - 9.09
30 13.04 13.04 -31.82 -52.17 -13.04
40 16.67 16.67 -40.05 -66.67 - 16.67
50 20.00 20.00 -47.31 -80.00 -20.00
..
TABLE III
Change of Percent of Probability with
Advantage of Defender Side
The hit probability of offensive tank (P_,) ; 0.6
The fire rate of offensive tank (A ) ; 0.037
The rate of mines in the field (R) ; 0.005
The hit probability of anti-tank weapon (P,) ; 0.6
The fire rate of anti-tank weapon (A ) ; 0.037
The value in a cell of Table III indicates the change
in percent of initial probability that an offensive tank
gets through the mine field due to the amount of change in
the parameter values. A positive value means an increased
P{N(D) = 1} and a negative value is the opposite. Table III
suggests that in the case of a duel between one offensive
50

tank and one defensive anti-tank weapon with mine field, the
most sensitive parameter is the hit probability of the de-
fensive anti-tank weapon and the next sensitive is the rate
of the mine field. The reason the hit probability of the
anti-tank weapon is the most sensitive parameter is that the
anti-tank weapon of the defensive forces has the advantage
of firing its first shot at an offensive tank by surprise.
Table IV gives the same information as Table III for the
case in which the anti-tank weapon does not have this
advantage; that is, the first shot of the duel is offensive
or defensive with a probability of h.
TABLE IV
Change of Percent of Probability







10 4.76 4.76 -11.94 - 4.76 - 4.76
20 9.09 9.09 -22.50 - 9.09 - 9.09
30 13.04 13.04 -31.82 -13.04 -13.04
40 16.67 16.67 -40.05 -16.67 -16.67
50 20.00 20.00 -47.31 -20.00 -20. 00
B. MODEL TWO
The numerical results for Model Two will use the same


















We also need to specify another value, P-.
-w which is the
probability of transition from state 1 to state 3. We will
assume the probability of transition from state 1 to state 3
is 1; P, 3 = 1. All rates are in units of distance as in
Model One.
1. There is No Defensive Anti-Tank Weapon
Table V gives the probability that at least one tank
gets through the mine field for various mine field depths
that are obtained from Equation (4.4),
TABLE V
Probability that at Least One Offensive Tank






D, depth of mine field in meters.
Equations (4.5) and (4.6) indicate that if a defender
wants to reinforce his defensive strength with mine fields
52

(make P{N(D)^1} smaller), there is no effective difference
between increasing the rate of mines or lengthening the
depth of the mine field.
2. There is One Defensive Anti-Tank Weapon
TABLE VI
Probability that at Least One Tank Gets Through
The Mine Field Successfully Depends on
Speed and Depth of Mine Field













D, depth of the mine field in meters.
Speed: Speed of the tank in kilometers per hour.
The results of Table VI are obtained from the
Equation (4.8). Note that as the speed of the offensive tanks
increase, the P{N(D) > 1} decreases. Increasing the speed
of the offensive tanks causes the firing rate in duel to
decrease from A = A_ = 0.037 rounds per minute to ^ a =^m =A T




Let A be the sum of all the probabilities of the
events in (4.7) in which Y(D) = 0.
Let B be the sum of all the probabilities of the
events in (4.7) in which Y(D) = 3. Table VII gives values
for A and B for various different X A = X with all other
parameters as in (5.1).
TABLE VII
Change of Probability Depends on Speed
XA AT A B
0.037 0.037 4.97xl0~ 9 0.39128
0.0333 0.0333 1.89xl0~ 6 0.39063
0.0299 0.0299 6.30xlC~ 6 0.38991
X X fire rate in rounds per minutesA i 1 /
Note that A increases as the fire rate decreases
and B decreases as the fire rate decreases, as is expected.
Hence, it appears that the reason P (N(D) 11} decreases
as the offensive tank speed increases is that for the
range of parameters we are interested in A is very small
relative to B.
Table VIII investigates the sensitivity of the
five basic parameters in the model with a mine field depth
















10 2.69 2.69 -10.50 - 2.68 - 2.68
20 5.01 5.01 -20.13 - 5.24 - 5.24
30 7.05 7.05 -28.91 - 7.67 - 7.67
40 8.83 8.83 -36.87 -10.00 -10.00
50 10.41 10.41 -44.04 -12.22 -12.22
%; increasing percent of value of parameter
PT ; hit probability of an offensive tank,
A_; fire rate of an offensive tank,
R; rate of mines in the mine field
P.; hit probability of a defensive anti-tank weapon,
The value in a cell of TABLE VIII shows the change
percentage of initial probability that at least one offensive
tank gets through the mine field successfully due to the
corresponding change in the parameter value. Positive values
indicate the probability P{N(D)£1} is increased and negative
values mean decreased P{N(D) >1}.
Table VIII suggests that if a duel begins between
two offensive tanks and one defensive anti-tank weapon,
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then the rate of mines in the mine field is the most impor-
tant parameter to effect the result. It indicates that a
defender who wants to decrease the probability of an
offensive tank crossing the mine field should make his
mine field with as high a value of rate of mines as possible
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As one of the best means of defense against an enemy's
quick attack, the mine field which is possibly defended by
an anti-tank weapon , is studied. Some formulae of simple
models have been derived and numerical evaluations and
analysis are provided for some cases for further interpre-
tation.
The model of this thesis used many assumptions. Some
assumptions are, the mines in the preinstalled mine field
act their characteristics with 100 percent reliability;
the duel between offensive tanks and defensive anti-tank
weapon is ended at the time when an offensive tank gets
through the mine field successfully; there are unlimited
ammunition supplies; and the damage of offensive tank due
to anti-tank weapon fire is classified only killed or not
killed.
Also, this thesis has considered in detail only two
models; however, many other models can be formulated as
continuous time Markov chain models. In these cases, the
probability that at least one tank successfully travels
through the mine field can be thought as the probability
that the continuous time Markov chain is in the particular
set of states at a finite time D (as in 4.7). The analytic
expression for this probability will in general not be
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simple; however, one can always write down a system of
differential equations for it which can be solved numerically,
If someone wants to make a model for a special area defense,
he can use these models possibly with modifications to meet
his needs. It may be more useful to combine these models
with an air defense model for some special area.
In conclusion, these models are simple and some assump-
tions are not real. However, they can provide insight to
evaluate the conventional preinstalled mine field and to
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